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15 February 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: SR/COP

VIA: C/SR/3

SUBJECT: Ideas for Black Radio Broadcasts to Ukrainians in the USSR.

1. Prefatory Statement: This outline is presented in the belief that a program of psychological warfare most advantageous to American interests can be best constructed by the examination of all data, positions and evidence connected with any given problem. It is held that free play in an open market of ideas in the long run produces the best results, and that failure to present evidence in an honest manner is a violation of good reporting as well as a species of dereliction of duty.

2. Basic Assumptions: This paper is based on the following assumptions:

- a. A global anti-Communist psychological warfare policy is predicated on the proposition that no sizable group--ethnic, economic, religious, or otherwise--should be written out of the struggle between the free and the Communist worlds. Accordingly, consideration should be given to a policy designed specifically to mobilize the Ukrainians in the USSR into the ranks of the free world.
- b. An effective and meaningful attempt to win over the Soviet Ukrainians to the side of the free world cannot be implemented without a prior study of the efforts applied by the Soviet government toward the same people. In other words, American efforts to wean away the Ukrainians from Communism, or to strengthen their resistance against Communism, must counteract Soviet efforts to win over the hyalities of the Ukrainian people.
- c. This agency is not a charity enterprise, and any black propaganda contemplated should be geared to hit the enemy where it hurts, and particularly should not be allowed to degenerate into a superfluous duplication of other anti-Communist propaganda outlets, or into a cozy support of an enige group.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES/METHODS EXEMPTION 3828  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
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3. Sources:

- a. M. POGORNYI, "The Soviet Ukraine in the Fraternal Family of Nations of the USSR" (Sovetskaya Ukraina v Bratskoy Sem' Natsionov SSR); Kommunist, Nr. 8, May 1954, pp. 12-26; Moscow.
- b. M. I. SUPRUNENKO, "Formation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic" (Obrazovaniye Ukrainskoy Sovetskoy Sotsialisticheskoy Respubliki); Vostokye Izvestiya, Nr. 2, February, 1954, pp. 20-40; Moscow.
- c. A. ROMANTSEV, "Economic Cooperation of the Russian and Ukrainian Peoples" (Ekonomicheskaya Sotrudnichestvo Russkogo i Ukrainskogo Narodov); Kommunist, Nr. 7, May 1954, pp. 15-32; Moscow.
- d. M. SIKHONINOV and A. LIKHOLAY, "Three-Hundredth Anniversary of the Union of Ukraine with Russia" (Triystotsletiya Yedyneniya Ukrainy s Rossiei); Kommunist, Nr. 1, January, 1954, pp. 52-69; Moscow.
- e. M. BAZHAN, "Friendship of Peoples, Friendship of Literatures" (Druzhba Narodov, Druzhba Literatur); Kommunist, Nr. 18, December, 1953, pp. 81-86; Moscow.
- f. O. VIENYS, "The Unbreakable Friendship of the Russian and Ukrainian Peoples" (Nerastoyimaya Druzhba Russkogo i Ukrainskogo Narodov); Vostokye Izvestiya, Nr. 1, January 1954, pp. 31-45; Moscow.
- g. Speech by I. E. VERKHNILOV at the meeting of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on 19 February 1954; Radynska Ukraina, Nr. 49 (9879), 27 February 1954, Kiev; on the occasion of the transfer of the Krymskaya Oblast to the Ukrainian Republic.
- h. D. BABII, article in Radynska Ukraina, Kiev, 14 May 1954 (Nr. 89) entitled "Equal Among Equals", (Uzh Rivnyi Rivni).
- i. The Case of Joseph KRUTII (Newspaper and Radio Comments in the USSR).
- j. M. V. KOROTSKIY "Development of Sovereignty of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in the Composition of the USSR" (Rozvyt Suvorinosti Ukrainskoy Radynskoy Sotsialisticheskoy Respubliki v Sklad Ukrainy); Vostokye Izvestiya, Nr. 8, August 1954, pp. 3-13; Kiev.

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4. Comment on Sources:

a. Although not exhaustive, these sources are believed to be typical, representative, and to reflect accurately Soviet propaganda directed to the Ukrainians in the USSR.

b. These sources repeatedly use the following clichés and slogans:

"The Ukrainian people have built a truly independent sovereign state" (naselennost' Ukrainy stvorila nezavisimuyu suverenynu derzhavu); "independence" (nezavisimost'); "national state" (narodna derzhava); "freedom and national independence" (svoboda i narodna nezavisimost'); "voluntary union" (dobrovolnyi soюз); "a free and independent Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic" (volinaya i nezavisimaya ukrainskaya sotsialisticheskaya Sovetskaya Respublika); "independent nation" (nezavisimyy narod); "true equality" (pravdivne ravnopravie); "national Ukrainian state" (narodna ukrainska derzhava); "free, independent, and sovereign socialist state" (volin, nezavisoma, suverenna, sotsialistychna derzhava);

c. The Soviet line holds that the current Ukrainian Soviet Republic meets all the requirements of sovereignty and that only under the Soviet system, with the essential aid of the Russian people, can the Ukrainians maintain an independent and sovereign state.

d. The Soviet line holds that "bourgeois nationalists" are bent upon destroying Ukrainian sovereignty and independence, today with the aid of the imperialist Americans, in the past with the aid of the imperialist Entente and Germany. The objectives of the nationalists are not denied; rather, it is held that the nationalists use their declared objectives as a cover for turning over the Ukrainians to foreign occupants, whereas in the Soviet system these objectives have been realized. "Bourgeois nationalists" are repeatedly accused of desiring to "tear away the Ukrainian people from the Russians and to turn them over to colonial slavery".

e. In line with (d) above, emphasis is put upon the benefits, real and imaginary, present and past, that the Russian people have brought to the Ukrainians. This is coupled with out-and-out chauvinism, expressed in such facets as the distortion of history; editing of such writers as Ivan Franko, Lesya Ukrainka, and Taras Shevchenko; exaltation of the influence of Russian writers on Ukrainian literature; and the denial of value to most things Ukrainian unless their creation can be attributed to benign Russian guidance.

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## 5. Conclusion:

- a. Effective American psychological warfare should be designed to frustrate the Soviet effort to win and hold the loyalties of the Soviet Ukrainians by diverting Ukrainian nationalism from its traditional orientation and by brain-washing the Ukrainians into believing that they have <sup>the</sup> substance of sovereignty and independence.
- b. Effective American psychological warfare requires the citation of chapter and verse, both historically and as occasion presents itself in day-by-day developments, wherein the Soviet Ukrainians might be given the opportunity to know facts suppressed or distorted by Soviet propaganda; to compare Soviet claims and trappings with the essentials and substance of true sovereignty; to hear poetry and prose banned in the Soviet Union (the proscribed materials are invariably "bourgeois nationalist").
- c. Consideration should be given to a possible turn of events if the free world fails to implement an effective psychological warfare program toward the Soviet Ukrainians. There is danger that an inadequate program, that is a program that does not expose effectively all Soviet claims, will backfire against the free world, serving to document and fortify Soviet propaganda claims, vis-a-vis the Ukrainians. Again, a program that fails to come to grips with the Soviet line is a dual-danger, for it will not only produce no returns on an investment but may push people with a natural patriotism into a pro-Soviet position. Soviet strategy today endeavors to convert Ukrainian nationalism from a centrifugal, anti-Soviet, and "anti-Russian" (the last in the sense that Ukrainian nationalism traditionally rejects Russian historiography, geopolitical, and cultural definitions, not in the sense of ecological nationalism or "hatred of the Russian people") force into a centripetal, pro-Soviet, and pro-Russian force. Evidence that the Soviet policy of exploiting local nationalisms is global can be seen in the Leninist-Stalinist interpretation of colonialism and imperialism, in recent events in Asia (the union of nationalism and Communism in China, Viet Nam), and in the concerted Soviet effort to reform the traditional nationalisms of its East European satellites (Poland, Czechoslovakia, etc.) into a pro-Soviet and pro-Russian mold. Failure to exploit weaknesses in the most vulnerable Soviet areas, specifically the setting up of taboos in regard to efforts to win over the Ukrainians to the side of the free world, in effect, extends a Soviet veto into American psychological warfare efforts. This hesitancy and crippling stands in sharp contrast to Soviet anti-American charges of germ warfare, aggression in Asia, and the alleged plans to turn the Ukraine into an American colony after the fashion of Hitler.

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**6. Critiques:** In order to show that the preceding analysis is not valid, the following tasks require implementation:-

- a. Show that the listed sources are not representative, or have been misrepresented, distorted, or misunderstood.
- b. Show that the Soviet line herein described is a temporary post-Stalin phenomenon likely to fade with the eclipse of Malenkov. However, to suggest that the line of the Khrushchev group will vary from that of Malenkov on the Ukrainian problem is to suggest that the Malenkov (or 1954) Soviet line is deemed prejudicial to Soviet interests by the new Soviet ascendants. Once that is accomplished, the even harder job of showing that a propaganda line by the free world, based on what is considered prejudicial to Soviet interests by the new Soviet rulers, is prejudicial to the interests of the free world will have to be tackled.
- c. Show that the essence of Soviet propaganda and practices, especially their elements of Russification, centralization and denationalization, is in its essence and results intrinsically "anti-Russian".
- d. Show that, whereas Soviet propaganda may use such slogans as "Ukrainian independence", "sovereignty" and "national Ukrainian state" without driving the Russians in the USSR into an anti-Soviet position, use of the very same slogans by the free world will drive Russians in the USSR into a pro-Soviet, anti-Western position.

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